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CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE CORPORATE ASSET THEORY
INTRODUCTION
Since the corporation has become the institution responsible for the
bulk of American industrial production,' its importance cannot be over-
emphasized. In 1933, Mr. Justice Brandeis commented that:
Through size, corporations, once merely an efficient tool employed
by individuals in the conduct of private business, have become an
institution-an institution which has brought such concentration of
economic power that so-called private corporations are sometimes
able to dominate the State. The typical business corporation of the
last century, owned by a small group of individuals managed by their
owners, and limited in size by their personal wealth, is being sup-
planted by huge concerns in which the lives of tens or hundreds of
thousands of employees and the property of tens or hundreds of
thousands of investors are subjected, through the coi'porate mechan-
ism, to the control , of a few men. Ownership has been separated
from control, and the separation has removed many of the checks
which formerly operated to curb the misuse of wealth and power.
And as ownership of the shares is becoming continually more dis-
persed, the power which formerly accompanied ownership is becom-
ing increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few. 2
Thus, the decisions made by corporate management have a profound
effect not only upon employees directly concerned, but also upon the
whole of our society. For this reason we should be vitally concerned that
the corporate institution is run not only at maximum efficiency in terms
of profit to the corporation, but also that it pursues a course of conduct
that is most beneficial to the entire society which it serves.
However, corporation law has in many areas failed to recognize this
need. As Professor Berle points out,3 corporate law has evolved from
the time when corporations were relatively small and private, and has
been directed primarily toward the protection of the property interests
of minority stockholders. 4 Although the attention given to this area has
been deserved, other important areas have become wastelands of con-
flicting rules of case law. One of the most important of such areas is that
of corporate control.
'Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration, 33 REv. OF EcoN. AND
STAT. 269 (1951).
'Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 564 (1933).
'Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1958).
4See, e.g., REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 15-902, 908. (Hereafter REVISED
CODES OF MONTANA will be cited R.C.M.) In order to secure uniform corrective
legislation, the federal government, acting under its power over interstate commerce
and over the mails, passed the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)
et seq. (1958), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §
78(a) et seq. (1958). These acts generally apply only to large "quasi-public"
corporations, but the main purpose of the Acts is to protect the public as investors
in corporate securities.
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THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL
"Corporate control," in its broadest sense, is power over corporate
conduct. This power may be exercised either through the ability to
choose corporate directors and management, or through influence over
the decisions made by such officers. Because the power to choose di-
rectors is generally related to the voting shares of stock issued by the
corporation,5 control may initially appear to be a property right, inher-
ent in the stock. It may be argued that the election of the directors is
a function of the corporation that has been delegated to the stockholders
and is exercised by the votes of the shares.6 The owner of the shares
acquires this power to elect directors in proportion to the amount of
stock he owns. Since control power is majority power under most cor-
porate codes,7 if a stockholder holds a majority of the stock he may be
said to "own" control as a part of his property right in the stock.
Another view of control is that although it is a private function, it
has substantial public responsibilities, and as such, is a corporate asset.
Professor Berle first advanced this concept in 1932.8 Under this view, the
holder of control is not so much the owner of a proprietary right as an
occupier of a power position. The reason for this is the very nature of
our corporate codes. Each state grants the corporation the power to
choose its board of directors, and requires that this be accomplished
through the votes of the stockholders.9 Since a requirement of unanimity
is impractical, a "corporate democracy" is allowed, and the majority may
elect and prevail over the minority. Berle asserts that this is essentially
nothing more than a device to assure continuity of management-a mat-
ter of corporate convenience-and therefore it is corporate power al-
though it is exercised by individual stockholders. 10 Thus, although a
majority stockholder has the capacity to control the corporation
through the votes of his stock, he does not own this control in the same
sense as he owns his right to participate in dividends or liquidation. His
control is extraneous and occurs as a result of the corporation's power
to choose a board of directors by less than unanimity.
Professor Bayne concurs with Berle that control is a corporate asset 1
but expands upon the concept from the fiduciary aspect. Since a majority
stockholder exercises control over all the corporation's affairs, he is in
fact controlling some assets belonging tothe minority stockholders. Bayne
argues that the holder of control is therefore in a fiduciary custodial
relationship to the minority stockholders and is accountable to them.12
58See, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 15-405, 15-504.
6R.C.M. 1947, § 15-302.7See, e.g., R.C.M. 1947, § 15-405.
8BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
"E.g., supra note 5.
'
0Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628, (1965).
"Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 22, 67 (1963).
"Professor Bayne envisions something more than the reciprocal rights and duties
between stockholders. Since the holder of control wields much more power than the
average stockholder regarding corporatu assets, he is in a position more like a
[Vol. 27,
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This custody is an assumption in trust of a valuable item, with all the
appurtenant duties and rights.1 3 Therefore, according to Bayne, control
is the dominion over another's goods and the duties and rights appur-
tenant to such dominion. 14 Reasoning under this broad concept, he main-
tains that control is actually a corporate office, rightfully belonging
within the corporate entity with the management and shareholders 15 and
subject to all the fiduciary duties and responsibilities inherent in this
position.
The useful applicability of these two divergent views cannot be fully
appreciated unless they are applied to situations where control prob-
lems occur, and the results are compared. The location of control itself
is a large factor in determining whether either theory is workable.
THE LOCUS OF CONTROL
Under normal circumstances, control is closely connected with the
voting shares of stock,'6 although situations may occur where it is totally
unrelated to such shares or votes. There are five general situations that
illustrate the location of control:
1. Where the holder of control holds 100 percent of all voting stock.
2. Where the holder of control holds more than fifty percent of all
voting stock.
3. Where the holder of control holds less than a majority of all vot-
ing stock, but holds a large minority block, and the majority is
scattered.
4. Where the holder of control holds a small minority block, but
also has a relationship with the board of directors whereby they
will act in accordance with his wishes.
5. Where the holder of control holds a negligible amount of stock,
or even none, but is in a position to influence corporate decisions
nonetheless.
Under the first two situations, in most cases, the control is carried
purely by the voting power of the stock. This is compatible with the
present general system of corporate law which allows the majority of
voting stock to choose the corporate directors.'7
However, the problem in locating control arises as one progresses
down the scale.
The third situation is one in which control is not carried by the ma-
jority of the stock. Rather it is found in a combination of the minority
-block vote and the holder's capacity to secure the necessary complement
director or officer, and therefore in a fiduciary position to his fellow stockholders.
For this reason, Bayne would regard the holder of control as an officer, and
"control" itself as a corporate office.
'
3Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, supra note 11, at 26.
"Ird. at 27.
1Id. at 30.
"See BERLE AND MEANS, Op. cit. supra note 8.
'
TSupra note 5.
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of votes from the scattered majority by use of the corporation's proxy
machinery. For example, if the holder of control owns thirty percent of
the outstanding voting shares, and there are several thousand other
stockholders holding less than one percent of the shares each, he can
easily acquire the requisite fifty-one percent vote necessary to elect his
slate of directors by use of the proxy. Most small investors trust the
judgment of corporate management, and will follow the slate recommen-
dation as found in the proxy. The control then becomes a combination of
the minority thirty percent individual control plus the overwhelming
probability that the scattered stock will acquiesce in the recommenda-
tion. Although our present corporate codes do not recognize the legiti-
macy of such control, most businessmen and courts realize this kind of
control is a fact of life. The United States Congress, in the Investment
Company Act of 1940, provided that there is a rebuttable presumption
that twenty five percent of voting stock carries control.18
In the fourth situation, it is even less apparent that control is con-
nected to the ownership of voting stock. This is frequently called "work-
ing control" 19 and is one of the most problematical areas. Here the bulk
of control is lodged in the control holder's ability to persuade corporate
management to accept his suggested slate of directors or business de-
cisions. The power carried 'in the stock is subordinate and incidental,
although it may be used as one of many tools of persuasion. Such con-
trol probably occurs with greater frequency in the large corporate en-
tities in which a substantial percentage of the outstanding stock is not
held by any one person or group. Control of this sort is not expressly
recognized in corporate codes or by Congress, and probably occurs less
frequently than the other types mentioned.
In the fifth situation, control is dependent almost solely upon the
personal influence that the holder has over corporate management, with-
out regard to any stock he may hold. Such control is always exercised
sub rosa, as it is hardly recognized even as a fact, and when found is con-
sidered to be most reprehensible. It is difficult to estimate the frequency
of occurrence of this type of control, due to its inherent secrecy. Whether
it is exercised by a lone ultimate consumer or a crime syndicate, the con-
trol is no less absolute.
The above examples illustrate the gamut of situations in which con-
trol problems may arise. As the percentage of voting stock owned by
any one shareholder becomes smaller, the less control depends upon such
stock for its power, and the more the holder must rely upon his extrane-
ous personal relation with the board of directors or management.
CONTROL CONCEPTS RELATED TO CONTROL LOCUS
The concept that control is a property right inherent in stock own-
ership is arguably applicable in the situation where an absolute majority
m815 U.S.C. § 80(a) (2)-(a) (9) (1963).
'
9Berle, The Price of Power, supra note 10, at 630.
[Vol. 27 ,
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of voting stock is held. If the control holder has absolute majority,
his control is usually not based upon any purely personal power: In such
case, control may be said to be inherent in the stock much the same as the
right to participate in dividends or liquidation. By such reasoning, it is
arguable that control in this situation is neither a corporate asset nor a
corporate office.
However, this concept is unworkable in many situations where con-
trol problems arise, since control by definition 20 does not require absolute
majority stock ownership, and may be equally absolute and effective
through outside influence over the decision-making function of corporate
management. When the holder of control owns less than an absolute ma-
jority, his control is due partly to voting power and partly to outside
factors such as the distribution of the majority of the stock, his personal
relations with the directors or management or lethargy in the majority
shareholders. Although he may have effective or practical control, the
corporate codes do not provide for control existing anywhere but in the
majority of shares. Thus, the concept that control is a property right is
wholly inadequate in many corporate situations.
Professor Berle's thesis that control is actually a corporate asset is
a more useful concept in the varied situations which may arise. It is
equally applicable to control through stock ownership and to control
through personal influence. If control is a corporate asset, it must be
treated as property of the corporation by whomever happens to be the
holder at the time. The broad fiduciary duties incumbent upon one en-
trusted with such an asset facilitate the solution of any problems arising
with respect to control.
Despite the fact that the corporate asset theory is more advantage-
ous than the property right doctrine, it has received a good deal of criti-
cism from writers and courts. 21 The principal criticism advanced by prop-
erty rights theorists is that application of the corporate asset concept
would interfere with stock sales and prevent the holder of controlling
shares from realizing the full market value of his shares.22 The sale of a
block of controlling shares usually carries with it a substantial premium
price paid for the transfer of control. The purchaser's willingness to pay
a premium springs from an expectation of returns which are derived
from the control, and that this premium is part of the value of the con-
trol shares. Under the corporate asset theory, this premium is paid for a
corporate asset and belongs to all the shareholders ratably.
Another criticism is that the corporate asset theory is inapplicable
since all transfers of control are not reprehensible. It is argued that the
'Text supra note 4 et seq.
'Note 29 infra.
'This criticism stems from a disagreement as to just what is the true value of the
stock shares. Property rights theorists claim that it is what a buyer would pay for
the block of stock, and even if the block sold brings a higher price because it has
control, this is the "true market" value of the shares. Proponents of the corporate
asset theory maintain that all the outstanding shares of stock should have the same
value, and the control factor should not make one particular block inherently worth
more than any of the other like shares.
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theory assumes the purchaser will pay the premium to later exploit the
corporation and that his directors therefore will not exercise their man-
agement powers in the interests of all the stockholders. The critics con-
tend that such is not always the case, and that the power may be used
to improve earnings and management, thereby benefitting all the stock-
holders. The restriction on the sale of control by application of the cor-
porate asset theory could therefore harm more corporations than it helps,
and the application of such a broad rule would impede desirable transfers.
A third criticism is that application of the corporate asset theory
would discourage majority investments by reducing the incentive to
make such investments. The purchaser would be reluctant to invest in a
control block of shares if he could not later himself sell it at a substantial
premium as a return on his investment.
Although all these criticisms are in a sense legitimate, further inquiry
will demonstrate that the application of the corporate asset theory is not
so detrimental as the critics would make it appear. In answer to the first
criticism, the holder of control is not deprived of any value inherent in
the shares themselves. He realizes the same full "investment" value on a
sale as any other stockholder would, but is not allowed to retain a profit
from selling something other than his stock unless he shares this profit
with all the other stockholders. 23 Since the buyer may not pay the con-
trol holder a premium and thereby gain 100 percent of the dividend rights
on a purchase of eighty percent of the stock, neither should he be al-
lowed to pay the holder of control a premium to gain 100 per cent of
control for eighty per cent of the stock. To do so would be to allow the
seller to retain a profit for selling the other stockholders' ratable share
of a corporate asset. The buyer should therefore be required to prorate
to all of the shareholders any sum greater than the seller's proportionate
interest in the corporation. If the buyer does pay the seller more than
his proportionate share of the total value of the corporation, although
the amount he pays may be correct, he is paying part of it to the wrong
party. If the seller retains this premium, he denies the other sharehold-
ers their right to this amount. Since the premium belongs to all the
shareholders, it belongs to the corporation and is therefore a corporate
asset.
2 4
The corporate asset theory does not necessarily assume that al con-
trol transfers are reprehensible, hut is merely a safeguard against those
3For example, if the control holder has less than 100 per cent of all the outstanding
stock, but the purchaser buys 100 per cent of the stock, the total price paid is the
legitimate value of the corporation's assets to the buyer. These assets include
physical assets, receivables, cash, goodwill and control. In the 100 per cent purchase,
the buyer pays each individual stockholder his proper proportion of the total,
including a prorated amount for control. If the control holder has eighty per ceni
of the outstanding stock, he receives eighty per cent of the total value of the cor-
poration to the buyer, and eighty per cent of the amount paid for control.
Similarly, if the buyer only purchases working control or majority control, the
basic equities are unchanged. The fact that only a part, rather than the whole of
the corporation has been purchased, does not alter the respective rights of each
individual stockholder. As each has a proportionate share of the whole, each has a
proportionate share of the part purchased.
-nFor a more complete explanation, see Bayne, supra note 11, at 64-65.
[Vol. 27,
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that in fact are. its application does no harm to the honest entrepreneur
who takes over control for the purpose of improving the corporation and
his interest. The corporate asset theory allows him everything that is
due to him, while at the same time it removes the temptation for a quick
profit which would benefit the holder individually, but would be a detri-
ment to other shareholders and the public at large.
The same counter-argument may be applied to the assertion that the
corporate asset theory would discourage majority investments. So long
as the investor makes no attempt to appropriate property which in
equity should belong to all the shareholders, he has nothing to fear from
the corporate asset theory. Its application would, however, encourage
minority investors by insuring the safety of their investment and afford-
ing them a greater means of protection from the occasional unscrupulous
majority investor.
ABUSE OF CONTROL
Since the holder of control, by definition, exercises the final author-
ity in corporate decisions and conduct, the manner in which it is exercised
is of great concern. Since the holder of control in many cases is also an
officer in the corporation, the danger of an exorbitant salary is always
present. Although the executive is entitled to a "living wage '25 the
problem of overpayment may frequently occur. The dispensation of jobs
to unqualified family or friends may be an abuse of control to the detri-
ment of the other shareholders.2 The holder of control is in a position to
grant favorable, non-competitive contracts to other businesses in which
he may have an interest, and is able to exploit a "corporate opportunity"
for his own personal benefit.27 Another area open to abuse by the holder
of control is exploitation of a "tax loss" corporation.28
But perhaps the largest number of instances of abuse of corporate
control, and the one which has raised the most provoking litigation, is
the outright sale of control through the transfer of shares or otherwise.29
'See, Washington, The Corporation Executive's Living Wage, 54 HARV. L. REV. 733
(1941).
"See, Gilbert, McPhail--The Nadir in Proxy Fights, 18 U. DET. L.J. 7, 9 (1954).
'A corporate opportunity may take many forms, but is most generally found as a
contract or offer which was made to or intended for the corporation. It is usually
something which the corporation would handle in its course of business as a part
of its profit making scheme, although other types of offers such as an offer of
merger also qealify. Therefore, when an executive in a corporation accepts the offer
in his individual capacity, or subverts the contract for his personal profit, his conduct
is a breach of a fiduciary relationship.
2DINT. Rxv. CODE O5 1954, §§ 381, 382, allows a tax advantage in the form of an oper-
ating loss carryover that inures to the benefit of the acquiring corporation. When the
outstanding shares of the acquired corporation bring a price which takes into account
the value of the tax advantage, this may be described as a "non balance sheet
asset". Thus, the holder of control could elect to sell his corporate control to a
-purchasing corporation who wanted the benefit of his corporation's losses for tax
purposes, and might command a premium price for the existence of these losses.
This could act as a detriment to stockholders in the acquired corporation, as it is
doubtful that the acquiring corporation would seek to improve earnings and hence
their dividends for a time. For a further explanation, see Jennings, Trading in Cor-
porate Control, 44 CALIr. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1956).
,See, Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1958); Berle,
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Because most corporate codes are inadequate to cope with this problem,8 0
it has been incumbent upon the courts to decide the issue. This has pro-
duced a variety of conflicting and confused rules.
SALE OF CONTROL
"Old Majority" Theory of Sale of Control
Most courts once accepted the position that the holder of control was
free to sell his shares to any person, at any time, at any price, and that
he owed no fiduciary duty to the corporation or other stockholders. This
was true even when the holder was also a corporate officer, so long as he
was dealing with his own stock.31 This broad freedom has generally been
qualified by the traditional restrictions that the sale of control is im-
proper where the holder 1) negligently relinquishes control to looters,
2) fraudulently conspires with purchasers to relinquish control in return
for a premium paymefit, and 3) receives a premium for the sale of a cor-
porate office.
Keely v. Black was one of the early cases which allowed the seller of
control to keep his premium even though at the time of sale he was
president and a director of the company.3 2 The court reasoned that the
seller "was not dealing with the property of the company, but with his
own, the title to some of which he derived from other stockholders. '33
Stanton v. Schenck,34 which was pending when Berle first raised his theory
of control as a corporate asset, 35 is another such case. There, the seller of
control overcame an allegation of conspiracy and breach of fiduciary
duty, and was allowed to keep a premium on the sale of her stock. The
court found that there was no abuse of power and position and that no
fiduciary duty was breached by the directors since "[I]f it is granted
that a director may freely sell his own stock, it must follow that he may
benefit from the advantage due to his holding of an exceptionally large
block of stock. ' '36 In a derivative suit based on breach of fiduciary duty
The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L. Q. 628 (1965); Katz,
The Sale of Corporate Control, 38 CHI. BAR RECORD 376 (1957); Jennings, Trading
in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF L. REV. 1 (1956); Leech, Transactions in Corporate
Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725 (1956); Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control,
112 U. PA. L. REV. 22 (1963); Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 GF_.
L. J. 543 (1965); Bayne, The Definition of Corporate Control, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J.
442 (1965); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Quandary, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1965);
Bayne, The Sale of Corporate Control, 33 FORDHAm L. REV. 583 (1965); Note, The
Sale of Corporate Control: The Berle Theory and the Law, 25 U. PITT. L. REV. 59
(1963); Comment, Sales of Corporate Control and the Theory of Overkill, 31 U. CHI.
L. REV. 725 (1964); Comment, Sales of Corporate Control at a Premium: An Analy-
sis and Suggested Approach, 1961 DUKE L.J. 554; Comment, Sale of Corporate Con-
trol, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 869 (1952).
'Berle, "Control" in Corporate Law, supra note 3.
"STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d. ed. 1949); 3 FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. § 900
(perm. ed. 1965).
1291 N.J. Eq. 520, 111 Atl. 22 (1920).
1Id. at 523, 111 Atl. at 23.
8140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y. Supp. '221 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
"See, BERLE AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 243-44.
"Stanton v. Schenck, supra note 34, at 633, 251 N.Y. Supp. at 233.
[Vol. 27,
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by failure to properly investigate parties to whom he sold control, the
appellate court in Levy v. American Beverage Corp. allowed the seller to
retain his premium.3 7 The court found that there was no inference of
actual fraud, constructive fraud or negligence. A further ground was
that the plaintiff's entire complaint was based upon breach of fiduciary
duty, but a controlling stockholder is not a fiduciary in the sale of his
holdings.
The latest case adhering to this theory is Tryon v. Smith.38 The
action was brought on the theory that the seller had breached a fiduciary
duty to the stockholders by concealing from them the knowledge that he
and his associates were receiving over twice theamount for their control
shares' as the other stockholders were to receive for the sale of their stock.
The court denied recovery and stated that there was no fiduciary rela-
tionship between the stockholders so far as the sale of individual stock
was concerned and that there was no duty to apprise the minority stock-
holders of the premium offer. It was also held that the existence of a
premium was not evidence of fraud since it is generally recognized that
the stock of majority stockholders is of more value than that of the
minority.3 9
These cases illustrate that at least some courts, from the period of
1920 to 1951, still adhered to the strict property right doctrine of con-
trol. However, other courts in other cases have withdrawn from this
position, and this former majority rule may well now be the minority.40
The Sale of Office Limitation
Transfer of control has been disallowed by courts when it was ap-
parent that the transfer amounted to nothing more than a naked sale of
corporate power. One of the earliest cases to adopt this rule was McClure
v. Law.41 The seller was a former president and director of an insurance
company who delivered control to a stranger. Without purporting to sell
any corporate shares, control was transferred by procuring resignations
of the directors and substituting a new board, which then looted the cor-
poration. The action was brought by the receiver of the insolvent cor-
poration to recover payments made to the seller on the theory of breach
of fiduciary obligation. The court accepted this theory, stating that a
fiduciary obligation was owed to the corporation for official acts. Since
the election of directors and transfer of the management and property
of the corporation were official acts, whatever money the seller received
from such acts was derived by virtue of his office, and he should account
to the corporation for that amount. 42 Under facts such as these, the con-
cept of control as a property right is totally inapplicable, since the trans-
1265 App. Div. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942), reversing Levy v. Feinberg, 29 N.Y.S.2d
550 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
9191 Ore. 172, 229 P.2d 251 (1951).
11d. at 180, 229 P.2d at 254.
"Jennings, supra note 29, at 39; STEVENS, op. cit. supra note 31, § 150.
161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
"Id. at 81, 55 N.E. at 389.
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fer of control was in no way connected to any stock. The corporate asset
theory, however, is easily applied.43
Another case which barred the sale of office was Porter v. Healy.4 4
However, in this case, control was transferred by the sale of an absolute
majority of outstanding voting stock. A separate fund was set aside and
paid to the sellers for control. The court rejected the sellers' contention
that the fund was part of the price for the shares, and treated it as
secret consideration paid for the purpose of gaining immediate control of
the board of directors, that is, compensation for sale of the office. This
holding extended the rule of the McClure case to apply to transactions
transferring control where shares of stock were also exchanged. Al-
though it was relatively simple to segregate the amount paid for the stock
itself from the amount paid for control, the difficulty of this computation
in other transactions has raised objections to the corporate asset theory.45
These cases illustrate that where a separate payment is made for the
sale of corporate directorships, whether accompanied by a sale of stock
or not, the seller is liable to account to the corporation or other share-
holders. Utilizing the corporate asset theory in these situations is help-
ful, since it clearly shows that any payment made over and above the
actual "value" of the shares must go into the corporate treasury, or at
least through such treasury to the other shareholders.
Negligent Sale to Irresponsible Buyer Limitation (Looting Cases)
Another area where courts have refused to allow the seller of con-
trol to retain premium benefits of his sale is where control is transferred
to persons who later looted the corporation, and the sale was made under
circumstances putting the seller on notice of the probability of such
injury to the corporation. The leading cases in this field involve invest-
ment companies which are particularly susceptible to looting due to
liquidity of assets.
One of the earliest cases imposing liability for transfer of control
to irresponsible purchasers was Bosworth v. Allen.46 The former directors
of a savings and loan association sold their shares to outsider purchasers
for an amount in excess of the withdrawal value of the shares. The di-
rectors resigned, and the purchasers took over and looted the company.
The receiver brought action on the dual theories of sale of office and
tortious transfer of control to persons whom the defendants knew to be
irresponsible. The court granted relief holding that the sellers were
liable to account to the corporation not only for the money or property
in their hands, but also for the damages resulting from their misconduct.
The doctrine of the McClure case was utilized in support of imposition of
"See also, Field v. Western Life Indemnity Co., 166 Fed. 607 (N.D. Ill. 1908), aff'd
sub noin. Moulton v. Field, 179 Fed. 673 (7th Cir. 1910), cert. denied, 219 U.S. 586
(1911), for a similar situation reaching a similar result.
"244 Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428 (1914).
"The problem of valuation is discussed at length in Hill, The Sale of Controlling
Shares, 70 HAav. L. Rzv. 986 (1957).
"168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901).
[Vol. 27,
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liability for the premium, 47 and the tort theory of liability for damages.
In Insuranshares Corporation v. Northern Fiscal Corp.,45 controlling
shares totaling twenty seven per cent of the corporation's outstanding
stock were sold and an action was brought by the qompany against the
sellers for damages sustained from the subsequent looting. The court
allowed recovery on the tort theory of negligence, and imposed a duty
upon the sellers to make a genuine effort to investigate the purchaser and
his motives for fraud before making the sale.49 Although this reasoning
has been criticised,50 when ihe absolute power of control is considered,
it does not seem to be an undue burden upon the seller to make such in-
vestigation. The standard is not one of strict liability, but of reasonable-
ness only.
An investment company case' 1 some forty years after Bosworth, and
one year after Insuranshares combined the doctrines of these two cases and
imposed liability on the sellers for both premium and damages. This has
been criticised as double recovery and improper except as a punitive
sanction where the seller's action are flagrant and fraudulent.5 2 How-
ever, if the corporate asset theory is applied, such is not the case. The
proceeds of the sale of the office, a corporate asset, rightfully belong in
the corporate treasury. Any premium above the value of the stock sold
is a corporate profit. Additionally, if the seller is negligent in trans-
ferring control to the actual detriment of the corporation, the corpora-
tion should be allowed to recover for such tortious conduct to the extent
of the damage incurred. The two acts are separate and distinct. The
transfer of control may be fully legitimate and not be detrimental to the
corporation. However, the asset transferred is rightfully the corpora-
tion's, and any profit therefrom is corporate profit. The latter act, as
established by the foregoing cases, is an illegal, tortious act for which
the corporation has a right to be compensated. Moreover, the theories
of recovery are distinctly different.53
The foregoing cases illustrate that there is liability separate and
apart from any stock sold if control is transferred to irresponsible per-
sons without an adequate investigation by the seller. Unlike the recovery
of a premium, this recovery is based upon tort liability and actual dam-
ages. It may be imposed separate from and in addition to recovery of
the premium.
The Corporate Opportunity Limitation
It has been held that one in a fiduciary relationship to the corpora-
"McClure v. Law, supra note 41.
1835 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
"id. at 27.
040 CORNELL L.Q. 786, 793 (1955).
'Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
"Note, Sales of Corporate Control and the Theory of Overkill, 31 U. CH. L. REV.
725, 740-741 (1964); 68 UARv. L. REV. 1274, 1276 (1955).
"It is not suggested that a sale of a corporate asset is per se a tort. The proceeds
from the sale should be held in a constructive trust for the rightful owner.
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tion may not reap the benefits of a "corporate opportunity," by subvert-
ing such opportunity to his private use.
In Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, the corporation's opportunity to take
over a bankrupt corporation holding patents and manufacturing rights
necessary to the business of the defendant president's corporation was
appropriated by the individual defendant and some associates.5 4 The
defendant and associates later sold the controlling shares of the bankrupt
corporation at a large profit. Action was brought by the receiver of the
defendant's corporation against the defendant to account for the profits
under the theory of violation of a fiduciary duty. The court allowed re-
covery, holding that directors of a solvent corporation may not take over
a corporate contract for their individual profit. "If the directors are
uncertain whether the corporation can make the necessary outlays, they
need not embark upon the venture; if they do, they may not substitute
themselves for the corporation any place along the line and divert pos-
sible benefits into their own pockets. 55
The court in Guth v. Loft, Inc., found a similar rule.5 6 In that case,
the president of a corporation selling and manufacturing candy, syrups
and beverages appropriated his corporation's opportunity to acquire
ninety one per cent of the outstanding stock of the then insolvent Pepsi-
Cola company. He did not inform the other directors of the opportunity,
used his own corporation's assets to produce Pepsi-Cola, and in turn sold
the syrup to his corporation. The corporation brought suit asking that
the shares of Pepsi-Cola held by the president be transferred to it. The
court granted relief, holding that if an officer of a corporation acquires
an advantage rightfully belonging to the corporation, the law charges
this interest with a trust for the benefit of the corporation, and denies
the officer all benefit or profit. The court went on to say: 57
The rule . . . does not rest upon the narrow grounds of injury or
damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of confidence,
but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the
purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility of
profit flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed by the fidu-
ciary relation
Another case illustrating this principle is Commonwealth Title Ins.
and Trust Co. v. Seltzer.5 8 The directors were approached by another cor-
poration wishing to purchase their corporation's assets. They did not
disclose this offer, but quietly bought enough stock to acquire control,
negotiated privately with the prospective purchaser, and then sold the
control at a premium. After the sale of control, the directors acted as
the purchaser's agents and participated in the sale of the corporation's
assets to the purchasing corporation. A suit was brought to impress a
trust upon the excess profits taken. The court held that although the
price received by the corporation for the assets was adequate, the special
'473 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934).
5 MId. at 124.
523 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
51Id. at 510.
m227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910).
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profit received on the sale of the controlling shares was a profit received
from the sale of corporate property, not a separate transaction.
These cases illustrate yet another ground upon which courts have
denied the seller of control, or one in the fiduciary relationship to the
corporation, the benefits of his bargain, whether or not there are actual
damages present.
Transition Case-The Perlman v. Feldmann Decision
The modern case that has perhaps raised the greatest furor regarding
the sale of corporate control is Perlman v. Feldmann.5 9 The defendant
Feldmann owned or controlled thirty-seven per cent of the outstanding
shares of Newport Steel Corporation. The remaining shares were owned
by several thousand other stockholders, who had never formed a voting
block for the purpose of control. Feldmann, in addition to being con-
trolling stockholder, was also chairman of the board of directors and
president of the company. Newport was a steel manufacturer selling to
end users, but prior to the transfer of control was a marginal company.
As a result of the Korean conflict, steel was in short supply and a grey
market existed. A syndicate was formed by some steel users for the pur-
pose of purchasing Feldmann's stock in order to insure a continuing
source of steel, and Feldmann was aware of this. He sold the thirty
seven per cent control block to Wilport Co., the syndicate, for $20.00 per
share, although the over-the-counter price at the time was not over
$12.00 per share. Feldmann transferred control by delivering resigna-
tions of all the members of the board of directors and installing in their
places nominees designated by Wilport. This took place without notice to
the other shareholders. A derivative action was brought by certain of
the outside shareholders against Feldmann on the theory that the trans-
action was not a mere sale of stock, but an unlawful sale of control. The
lower court gave judgment for Feldmann. The court of appeals reversed,
and remanded the case to the district court with the order that the bur-
den of proof as to the value of the stock as an investment and the value
of the control be shown by the defendant. The court ruled that the pre-
mium should be shared by the defendant with the plaintiffs to the extent
of their respective stock interests, and that the plaintiffs were entitled
to recover individually. Judge Swan dissented on the ground that the
theory of recovery should have been sale of a corporate asset and the
recovery, if any, should go into the corporate treasury.
The language of the majority is so broad that it is difficult to ascer-
tain upon what basis the recovery was predicated. The case could be
treated as analogous to the looting cases, but since no reference is made
to these cases, it may be that the court intended to make the opinion
broad enough to encompass a wider variety of situations.6 0 It could also
be analogized to the sale of office or corporate opportunity cases on its
facts. A court could reason that since there was a rising market, the fu-
1129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952), rev'd, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
0°See Katz, The Sale of Corporate Control, 38 CHI. BAR REcoRD 376 (1957).
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ture profits the corporation could have made were sacrificed for Feld-
mann's quick profit. The rationale of the Porter6' ease, that the amount
of payment above the value of the shares belonged to the corporation as
a payment for the sale of an office, could also have been used. The re-
sult is justified by the need to protect the corporate institution in such
situations. Since the corporate asset theory is workable here, it should
have been utilized to avoid confusion as to how far the court was pur-
porting to extend its ruling. Judge Swan's dissent, requiring an account-
ing to the corporation for that portion of the price paid for the stock
which represented a payment for voting to elect new directors, is at the
heart of the corporate asset theory.6 2 As Professor Berle pointed out, it
makes little difference whether the premium is distributed directly to the
shareholders, or taken into the corporate treasury and distributed from
there.6 3 The broad and sometimes confusing language of this decision
has influenced a number of courts and has produced varied decisions.
Recent cases have not served to clarify this point of law.
RECENT CASES
In Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates64 the president and chairman of the
board of directors of Republic Pictures owned 28.3 per cent of its voting
stock. Essex negotiated a contract with him for the sale of his interest
at a price roughly two dollars above the market price, which amounted
to over two million dollars in premium. The transfer of control was to be
effected by the seriatim resignation of eight of the fourteen directors.
The defendant president repudiated the contract and Essex sued for
breach. The district court rendered a summary judgment for the de-
fendant and the court of appeals reversed. The sole question considered
by the court of appeals was whether the provision for seriatim resigna-
tions rendered the contract illegal and unenforceable. The court held
not, but for various reasons. All the judges agreed that although a-sale
of office is illegal, it is a sale of office only if the majority consent of the
stockholders is not obtained. The court felt that a majority was present
Porter v. Healy, supra note 44.
2Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 1955). (dissenting opinion). The
problem of stock valuation here was more difficult due to the absence of a separate
premium fund. The difficulty lies in segregating the legitimate value of the stock
sold from the amount paid for control. The considerations of market value, book
value, liquidation and future earnings may enter into the computation. In Feldmann,
the shares were selling over the counter below $12.00; the book value was $17.03,
and the Wilport syndicate paid $20.00 per share. The court found that the excess
over $14.67 per share plus interest was paid for control. 219 F.2d at 175.
Once the true value of the stock has been determined, and the premiuln established,
there is no justification for the seller being allowed to retain any excess over this
amount. See also, Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, supra note 29, at 819-
820; Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, supra note 28, at 37; and Hill, The
Sale of Controlling Shares, supra note 45, at 994-96, for an extended discussion of
the factors involved.
3Berle, The Price of Power, supra note 10, at 639. The majority and dissent seemed
to think the manner of distribution was quite important. Although it makes little
difference, this could account for the majority's hesitation to adopt the corporate
asset theory by name.
"305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
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clearly with the consent of fifty per cent of the stock and equivalently
with 28.3 per cent, so the sale here was legal.8 5 However, Judge Friendly
felt that if anything less than fifty per cent of the stock gave permission,
the sale would be illegal, 8 although the transfer on its face would be
legal. The court went on to state a general rule: "There is no question
of the right of a controlling shareholder under New York law normally
to derive a premium from the sale of a controlling block of stock. In
other words, there was no impropriety per se in the fact that Yates was
to receive more per share than the generally prevailing market price for
Republic stock. 8M This rule was qualified by citations to the "looting
cases" of Gerdes and Insuranshares,5 but as the court could find no threat
to the interests of the corporation or its shareholders in the instant case,6l
it concluded that the seller could keep the premium. The majority rule
is that, absent any detrimental effect to the corporation or its share-
holders, the payment of a premium is legitimate if made in conjunction
with consent by majority stock ownership or its equivalent. Judge
Friendly would rather require absolute majority stock consent as an
essential to both the legality of the transfer and premium.7 0
The application of the corporate asset theory would change only
half the conclusions drawn in this opinion. The legality of the sale as
such has no bearing upon whether the premium ought to be retained by
the seller. If the sale is illegal ab initio, then certainly no premium ought
to be retained. However, even though the transfer is legal, the premium
ought to go through the corporation to the stockholders pro rata.
In Honigman v. Green Giant Co., the court of appeals for the Eighth
Circuit upheld the lower court's decision to allow the retention of pre-
mium by the seller of control.7'1 Cosgrove was the founder and holder of
control of the Green Giant Corporation. The company had two classes
of stock: class A voting and class B non-voting. There was no difference
between the two classes except as to voting rights, but the class B stock
represented 99.9 per cent of the equity, earnings and dividend rights.
Cosgrove possessed twenty-six of the forty-four class A voting shares.
Over 400,000 class B shares were held by 1250 widely scattered people,
none of whom held more than two per cent. In 1960 the company voted
to recapitalize, providing for a single new class of voting stock. Class B
was exchanged share for share and class A at 1000 to one. By this, class
A equity increased from .01 per cent to 9.3 per cent,7 2 and Cosgrove re-
ceived about thirty three per cent of the vote through the exchange. A
6The court here confuses the practical effect of "working control" with the actual
majority necessary for election under the theory of corporate democracy, and thus
develops its ''equivalent majority'' rule.
MEssex Universal Corp. v. Yates, supra note 64, at 581. (concurring).
6Id. at 576.
sIbid.
wIbid.
7Id. at 581.
1208 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 941 (1963).
7
"Id. at 757.
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minority stockholder brought a class action to cancel the recapitalization
and to set aside the issuance of the premium shares to Cosgrove on the
theory that the controlling stockholders were taking a two million dollar
bonus73 on something they didn't own, since corporate control is a cor-
porate asset. The court denied relief because no class A stockholder
could be expected to forego the power of control without receiving in
return consideration commensurate with the value of that control.
Therefore, the class A holders were entitled to their premium on the sale
of control. 74 Nor could the court find any conduct which would vitiate
the sale, saying that so far as considerations of immoral and repre-
hensible conduct arc concerned, the seller's position must be judged by
that which businessmen of ordinary prudence would have done under
similar circumstances. 75 The court of appeals, in affirming the lower
court relied wholly on its reasoning and concluded that "plaintiff has
wholly failed to demonstrate that the court's failure to apply the Berle
rule, that corporate control is a corporate asset, misapplied or misin-
terpreted the applicable Minnesota law."'76
The court apparently reasoned that since there was no immoral or
reprehensible conduct analogous to looting,77 the sale of control was legal.
As shown before, the legality or illegality of the sale has no bearing upon
whether control is or is not a corporate asset. But more important, since
the court determined that there had been an actual relinquishment of con-
trol,78 it felt the sellers had a right to retain the amount paid for that
control. However, control was in fact not relinquished by Cosgrove. He
merely exchanged absolute control for effective working control, as his
ownership of thirty three per cent of the class B shares after the ex-
change was sufficient to allow retention of all the power had had with
the class A shares.
Cosgrove made this exchange in an effort to improve the capital
structure of the company. For this, he "paid" himself a two million dollar
premium. 79
However, since the decisions made to the holder of control affect
all the assets of the corporation, including those assets represented by
"Even though here there was no actual payment, and no money changed hands, the
bonus nonetheless existed. Before the transfer, Cosgrove's stock represented only
.01 percent of the corporation's assets, while after the transfer, his class B stock
represented about thirty three percent of the assets. Thus, if the corporation had
liquidated immediately before, Cosgrove would have received very little, but after
the transfer, he would have received approximately two million dollars more.
tHonigman v. Green Giant Co., supra note 71, at 758.
75Id. at 762.
7309 F.2d 667, 670.
7nHonigman v. Green Giant Co., supra note 71, at 762.
711d. at 765.
79A cogent argument may be made that even granting the existence of a corporate
asset, the class B shareholders had no interest. It can be argued that if the class B
stock had no dividend rights, the class A stock could have commanded a higher
price for its dividend rights without having tas share this amount with the class B
holders. Since the class B stock here had no voting rights, the class A-holders should
therefore not have to share any premium paid for the purchase of the votes.
In this situation, the corporate asset argument breaks down unless it is approached
from the fiduciary relationship point of view.
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the outside shareholder's stock, he owes a duty to the other shareholders
to make decisions just such as this. Therefore, the effect here was a pay-
ment for a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation. The conclusion that
emerges from this case is that the holder of control was responsible for
providing the best possible corporate structure, and had at his disposal
the entire corporate apparatus with which to fulfill this responsibility.
The utilization of these assets should have been no more than the per-
formance of the fiduciary duty owed, and the premium paid should go
to benefit all the shareholders in the corporation.80
In In re Caplan's Petition,"' the New York Court of Appeals disallowed
a sale of control. Roy M. Cohn controlled six of the ten directors of the
Lionel Corporation with less than three per cent stock ownership. In
early 1963 he agreed to a deferred sale with an immediate transfer of
control to Defiance Industries, at a price equal to the existing market
price. His stock was in pledge at the time of transfer of control. Seven
months later, one Sonnabend made a similar arrangement with the now
controlling Defiance at a higher price. This agreement provided that a
majority of directors of Lionel should be persons designated by Sonna-
bend. The control transfer was made, but Cohn's stock was still in
pledge and had never been delivered to Defiance.82 A stockholder
brought action to set aside the election of the Sonnabend directors as
illegal.8 3 The court held that it was illegal to sell a corporate office with-
out sale of sufficient stock to carry voting control. The elections were
vacated, with the court quoting Essex and citing the McClure case.8 4 The
appellate division affirmed this holding,85 and the court of appeals af-
firmed without opinion.86
The Caplan analysis compares well with the analysis in Essex. As in
Essex, the court in Caplan was concerned with the corporate democracy
idea of majority consent. However, the Caplan court refused to view prac-
tical working control as equivalent to absolute majority control, '8 7 and
took the position of Judge Friendly in Essex as to the transfer.88 The
court said: "Even assuming that some sale or transfer of such stock
could be imputed in the transaction, certainly this three per cent of the
stock cannot be considered as carrying with it the power to elect man-
agement of the corporation."8 9 The facts in Essex and Caplan are similar,
and the Caplan court relied heavily on the Essex decision, thus failing to
distinguish between the separate problems of legitimacy of sale and re-
mFor an extended discussion of this case see Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control,
supra note 12, at 45-49.
8120 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964).
8"In re Caplan's Petition, sub nom. In re Lionel Corp., 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2391 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 1964, unreported).
8See, In re Caplan's Petition, supra note 81.
"In re Lionel Corp., supra note 82.
"In re Caplan's Petition, supra note 81.
"Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
s'In re Lionel Corp., supra note 82.
'Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, supra note 64.
'In re Lionel Corp., supra note 82.
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tention of premium. However, the situation in Caplan violates the sense
of corporate democracy more deeply, which may account for the differ-
ence in the positions taken by the two courts.
In Caplan, as in Essex, the application of the corporate asset theory
clarifies the situation. The determination of whether the actual sale is
legitimate should be left to principles laid down by the "sale of office,"
"looting cases" and other similar limitations.90 The adjudication of the
premium should be determined by the corporate asset theory. Once an
excess payment over the true value of the stock is found, it must go to
the corporate treasury or to the other stockholders.
Another case closely connected with Essex is Carter v. MuscatY1
Zeckendorf controlled six of the eleven directors of the Republic Cor-
poration with less than ten per cent of the voting stock. In 1963, the
B. S. F. Corporation agreed to buy the Zeckendorf interests. Control was
to be transferred by the seriatim resignation of the Zeckendorf directors
and their replacement with six B. S. F. nominees. One day after this,
B. S. F. paid market price for the Zeckendorf stock and took delivery.
The former president of Republic, brought action to set aside the elec-
tion as illegal since it did not take place in connection with the sale of
either a majority of the stock of Republic or of such a per cent as gives
working control, and relied on the rule of the Caplan case.9 2 The court
held that the transfer and election was not per se illegal, and ruled for the
defendants. 93 The court also distinguished the facts from the Caplan case
in that here, the purchase price was substantially the same as market price,
and in Caplan the price paid was one and one half times the market value
of the stock.9 4 In other words, there was no premium paid for control.
As in Essex and Caplan, this case involved a sale of control where
something less than an absolute majority of stock was transferred. It had
the choice of following the "equivalent majority" rule of Essex, or the "ab-
solute majority" requirement of Caplan. It chose to follow the former.9
In so doing, the court again failed to make the necessary distinction be-
tween the legality of the transfer and election and the payment of pre-
mium. Since there was no premium paid for the shares of controlling
stock, the corporate stockholders were not deprived of a corporate asset
because of the transfer. The only remaining consideration was whether
there had been overreaching or impropriety in terms of actual damage to
®Professor Bayne argues that the determination of legitimacy should be based upon
the theory that the payment of premium raises a rebuttable presumption of illegality,
which if unrebutted or unexplained, raises a presumption of unsuitability of the
nominees because of the impropriety of the appointment. 51 CORNELL L.Q. 49, 86
(1965). The case is analyzed in detail in this article.
°121 App. Div. 2d 543, 251 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1964).
"'Id. at 379-380.
1Id. at 381.
11d. at 380.
"The court seemed to give weight to the fact that here there was an actual transfer
of the stock of Republic, where in Caplan, the control stock remained in pledge.
The court also apparently thought that the Caplan rule allowed something less than
an absolute majority (working control) and that the ten percent present in the
instant case fulfilled this requirement. Actually, the court followed the majority
position of Essex in allowing legitimacy under an "equivalent majority" rule.
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the corporation resulting from the transfer and election. Since the court
found none, the corporation had not been deprived of any property or
damaged by an illegal transaction. The court reached the correct result
here, although its reasons for doing so are unclear.
CONCLUSION
The cases summarized above demonstrate the lack of understanding
with which the courts have disposed of problems raised by corporate
control. At the present time, the law is in a state of flux; each court is
searching for the correct answer on its own theory. If the modern cor-
poration is to fulfill its role in our present economic and societal
structure, it is necessary that the controlling hand be exercised in the
best interests of the many rather than the few. Because of this and the
fact that corporate codes are generally inadequate in this area, there is
need for a rule which will afford consistency in the solution of the prob-
lem. The corporate asset theory would help to provide a norm for the
most acceptable and efficient exercise of control. While it is no panacea,
its application would achieve the correct result in most situations, and
simultaneously afford a broad enough basis to offer consistency, thus
alleviating the corporate control anomaly existing in the courts.
RICHARD L. BEATTY.
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